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FOREIGN OFFICIAL, DEFINE THYSELF: HOW TO 
DEFINE FOREIGN OFFICIALS AND 
INSTRUMENTALITIES IN THE FACE OF 
AGGRESSIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
Alexander L. Harisiadis+ 
Since 2007, American companies engaged in commerce overseas have 
grappled with an increasingly stringent regulatory environment.1  The U.S. 
government utilizes the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 2  to pursue 
aggressively both domestic and foreign companies with a presence in the 
United States that allegedly bribe foreign officials to gain a business 
advantage.3  Since the statute’s enactment, the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have exercised almost 
unbridled discretion in applying the statute, due to a paucity of case law or 
authoritative opinions interpreting the Act.4  Furthermore, the ambiguity in the 
                                                 
 +J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; 
M.P.H., 2004, The George Washington University; B.A. 2002, The George Washington 
University.  The author is grateful to Professor Don Berthiaume for inspiring him to write this 
Comment; Jake Weixler and Steve Schulman of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP for their 
expert advice and encouragement; D.J. Baker for his invaluable guidance in the writing process; 
and his Catholic University Law Review colleagues for their tremendous work preparing this 
piece for publication. Finally, he would like to thank his parents, the good doctors Harisiadis, for 
everything; without them, the author would be nothing. 
 1. See, e.g., Shearman & Sterling LLP, FCPA Digest of Cases and Review Releases 
Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, at v 
(Philip Urofsky 2012), available at http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/bb1a7bff-ad52 
-4cf9-88b9-9d99e001dd5f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/590a9fc7-2617-41fc-9aef-04727f 
927e07/FCPA-Digest-Jan2012.pdf (providing an aggregate chart of FCPA corporate enforcement 
actions from 2002–2011 that demonstrates a marked increase in enforcement actions beginning in 
2007). 
 2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2006). 
 3. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, 
and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3 (2011) [hereinafter House 
Judiciary Comm. Hearing] (statement of Rep. Robert C. Scott, Member, H. Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec.); Joe Cassin, Has More FCPA Enforcement Brought Less 
Deterrence?, THE FCPA BLOG (Feb. 8, 2012, 4:28 AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/2/8/has-more-fcpa-enforcement-brought-less-deterrence.htm 
l. 
 4. See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Rep. F. James 
Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec.) (discussing 
how an absence of case law on the FCPA inflates prosecutorial discretion); see also ANDREW 
WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, UNITED STATES CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, 
RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT  
2–3 (2010) (stating that the FCPA’s primary interpretive function is still performed by the DOJ 
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FCPA has created compliance challenges for companies and individuals 
engaged in business overseas.5 
Much of the controversy over the FCPA centers on the terms “foreign 
official” and “instrumentality.”  The Act proscribes the giving of a bribe or 
questionable payment to “any foreign official” for a quid pro quo.6  Further, in 
the definitions section, the Act states that the term foreign official entails all 
the officers or employees of any foreign government instrumentality.7 
In particular, the business community is troubled by the lack of definitions 
of the terms “foreign official” and “instrumentality” in the FCPA.8  The FCPA 
creates liability for improper payments made to a foreign official, or to an 
official or employee of a foreign government instrumentality.9  However, who 
is properly a foreign official and what constitutes an instrumentality remains 
undefined, and consequently, the enforcement agencies have used this 
ambiguity to their advantage.10  For example, a consulting fee payment to a 
non-government official, as defined under that country’s law, may be 
considered payment to a foreign official under the FCPA.11  Further, payments 
to the minority owner of an entity that is wholly owned by a foreign 
government may also create FCPA liability.12  Further, the employee of a U.S. 
company partially owned by a foreign government may be considered a 
foreign official under the FCPA.13 
The DOJ and SEC’s recent enforcement actions take advantage of the lack 
of interpretive opinions on the FCPA.14  The DOJ has adopted an expansive 
definition of foreign official to include employees of government-owned 
enterprises; 15  this stonewalls attempts to clarify the meanings of foreign 
                                                                                                                 
and the SEC, which allows these agencies to read the Act aggressively); Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, 
and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a New Era, 43 U. TUL. L. REV. 99, 108 
(2011) (discussing how the SEC and the DOJ have unbridled discretion under the FCPA). 
 5. See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Rep. F. James 
Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec.) (noting 
how the business community complains that the FCPA’s vagueness makes it difficult for them to 
know if they are complying with the statute). 
 6. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2006). 
 7. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A). 
 8. House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 3. 
 9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1), -2(a)(1), -3(a)(1) (2006). 
 10. See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 3. 
 11. See infra Part I.C.1.ii. 
 12. See infra Part I.C.1.iii. 
 13. T. Markus Funk & M. Bridget Minder, The FCPA in 2011 and Beyond: Is Targeted 
FCPA Reform Really the “Wrong Thing at the Wrong Time”?, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS: 
CORPORATE AND M&A LAW, at 13 (Dec. 29, 2011), available at http://www.perkinscoie.com 
/files/upload/LIT_12_01funkminderfcpayear-in-review.pdf. 
 14. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining that the DOJ and the SEC are given 
significant discretion in interpreting the FCPA). 
 15. Koehler, supra note 4, at 108–16 (listing the foreign officials involved in recent FCPA 
enforcement actions, many of whom are officials of state-owned enterprises). 
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official and instrumentality.16  Such an interpretation is contrary to the FCPA’s 
legislative intent of preventing the bribery of foreign officials.17  Furthermore, 
courts are deprived of binding case law interpreting the FCPA because most 
prosecutions under the Act end in settlements, deferred prosecution agreements 
(DPAs), or non-prosecution agreements (NPAs).18  The absence of definitions 
of these terms either in the statute or in case law offers little guidance19 on how 
to comply with the FCPA 20  to companies that conduct business abroad. 
Consequently, these companies become subject to the statute’s harsh 
penalties21 without a practical tool with which to conduct due diligence.22 
The new regulatory environment, combined with the statute’s lack of clarity, 
crystallizes the need to increase the FCPA’s transparency.  The judiciary views 
many of the DOJ’s FCPA prosecutions skeptically and has dismissed a number 
of cases brought under the statute.23  On Capitol Hill, the business community 
and the defense bar have pressed Congress to bring greater clarity to the FCPA 
through amendments.24  However, amending the FCPA to achieve clarity is not 
                                                 
 16. See generally Examining Enforcement of the FCPA: Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 28 (2010). 
 17. See infra Part II.B. 
 18. See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 909–10 
(2010) (claiming that the frequent use of NPAs and DPAs has led to a decrease in both judicial 
scrutiny and substantive case law). 
 19. In November 2012, the SEC and the DOJ jointly released the long-awaited guidance 
document on the FCPA.  The document, entitled A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, covers all major areas of concern related to the Act, including the foreign official 
and instrumentalities controversy. See CRIMINAL DIVISION OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
& ENFORCEMENT DIVISION OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FCPA: A 
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf. 
 20. See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 28 (statement of the Hon. 
Michael Mukasey, Former Att’y Gen., Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton, LLP) (noting how 
inconsistent interpretations of instrumentality and foreign official makes it difficult for companies 
to comply with the FCPA). 
 21. See infra Part I.B.2.ii. 
 22. See infra notes 214–16 and accompanying text; see also House Judiciary Comm. 
Hearing, supra note 3, at 19, 23 (statement of the Hon. Michael Mukasey, Former Att’y Gen., 
Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton, LLP) (noting that the companies with compliance programs are 
still held liable for employees’ actions despite their due diligence). 
 23. See Andy Spalding, Lord Acton and the FCPA, THE FCPA BLOG (Feb. 27, 2012, 8:08 
AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/2/27/lord-acton-and-the-fcpa.html (explaining that the 
judiciary checks the executive authority by “exposing bad [FCPA] prosecutions”); see also 
Koelher, supra note 4, at 120–21 (rejecting the government’s argument that all tax reductions 
which directly or indirectly obtain or retain business constitute an FCPA violation); C.M. 
Matthews, Government Drops High-Profile FCPA Sting Case, CORRUPTION CURRENTS (Feb. 21, 
2012, 10:05 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/02/21/government-drops-high 
-profile-fcpa-sting-case/ (highlighting the DOJ’s decision to drop the prosecutions from its  
first-ever FCPA sting operation). 
 24. See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 18–36 (statement of the Hon. 
Michael Mukasey, Former Att’y Gen., Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton, LLP) (proposing six 
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met with universal support.  For example, anti-corruption advocates cite the 
recent Walmart Mexico bribery scandal25 as a prime reason against reforming 
the Act, 26  claiming that this scandal has “torched” FCPA reform. 27   The 
conflicting views have resulted in a two-front battle waging in the courts28 and 
on Capitol Hill29 over the FCPA.  At the forefront of this battle is the question 
of whether to clarify the definitions of foreign official and instrumentality.30 
This Comment explores the need for clearer definitions of the terms “foreign 
official” and “instrumentality.”  Part I traces the development of the FCPA and 
examines attempts by the DOJ, the SEC, and the courts to define foreign 
official and its related term, instrumentality.  In Part II, this Comment analyzes 
how the current definitions of foreign official and instrumentality are 
inadequate for the stringent enforcement of the FCPA.  In conclusion, this 
Comment offers a two-part solution for analyzing whether a certain entity is an 
instrumentality under the FCPA and if the employee of the instrumentality is 
truly a foreign official. 
                                                                                                                 
amendments to the FCPA on behalf of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform); Matthews, 
supra note 23 (noting how the U.S. Chamber of Commerce paid for a campaign lobbying to 
amend the FCPA). 
 25. David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level 
Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2012, at A1. 
 26. Stefanie Ostfeld, a policy adviser for Global Witness, an international civil society 
organization, stated, “I think it’s unbelievable that lawmakers would even contemplate weakening 
the FCPA when these allegations shine a spotlight on how bribery is still a major problem.”  
Samuel Rubenfeld, Wal-Mart Bribery Allegations Stir up FCPA Debate Anew, CORRUPTION 
CURRENTS (Apr. 24, 2012, 5:01 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/04/24/wal 
-mart-bribery-allegations-stir-up-fcpa-debate-anew/. 
 27. Richard L. Cassin, How Wal-Mart Torched FCPA Reform, THE FCPA BLOG (Jun. 20, 
2012, 3:51 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/6/20/how-wal-mart-torched-fcpa 
-reform.html (discussing how the Walmart scandal raised questions about whether a weakened 
FCPA would be beneficial).  But see Richard L. Cassin, Revive Jacobson’s Good-Faith 
Compliance Plan, THE FCPA BLOG (Aug. 27, 2012, 4:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog 
.com/blog/2012/8/27/revive-jacobsons-good-faith-compliance-plan.html (explaining that with the 
shock from Wal-Mart Mexico wearing off, the FCPA reform debate should be revived). 
 28. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1186–97 (C.D. Cal. 2011) 
(discussing a jury instruction on the FCPA’s knowledge requirement); United States v. Carson, 
No. SACR 09–00077–JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at *1, *11 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011) (denying the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss and holding that a broad definition of the FCPA terms is not 
prohibitive); see also Defendant O’Shea’s Opposed Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through 
Seventeen of the Indictment at 1–2, 4–8, United States v. O’Shea, No. 09-cr-00629 (S.D. Tex. 
Mar. 7, 2011) (arguing that state-owned entities are not “foreign officials” or “instrumentalities” 
under the FCPA). 
 29. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 30. See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 18–36 (statement of the Hon. 
Michael Mukasey, Former Att’y Gen., Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton, LLP) (proposing ways to 
clarify the meaning of foreign official and instrumentality); Joel M. Cohen et al., Under the 
FCPA, Who Is a Foreign Official Anyway?, 63 BUS. LAW 1243, 1270–71 (2008) (providing the 
DOJ and the SEC with four suggestions to provide businesses guidance on the FCPA). 
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I.  THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND ITS UNBRIDLED EXPANSION 
A.  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: Origins, Anti-bribery 
Provisions, and Penalties 
In 1977, Congress enacted the FCPA as an amendment to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.31  This legislative action created the United States’ 
primary tool for combating foreign bribery by U.S. corporations and citizens.32   
1.  The Waves of Watergate  
The FCPA’s origins trace back to the exposure of corruption in the Nixon 
administration,33  uncovered in the wake of the Watergate break-in.34   The 
                                                 
 31. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, 1494 (1977) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)).  Recognizing the necessity of a  
well-regulated securities market, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 pursuant 
to its authority to regulate interstate commerce.  See, e.g., United States v. Kunzman, 125 F.3d 
1363, 1365 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that Congress did not exceed its authority under the 
Commerce Clause when it enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Sloan v. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, 27 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1975) (declaring that it is “frivolous” to question Congress’s 
constitutional authority to pass the Exchange Act or any future rules or regulations promulgated 
from the statute). 
 32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78(m) (2006); see Lay Person’s Guide, Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, Antibribery Provisions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov 
/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf (last visited Dec. 24, 2012) (“Congress enacted 
the FCPA to bring a halt to the bribery of foreign officials and to restore public confidence in the 
integrity of the American business system.”).  Congress’s intent in shaping this anti-bribery tool 
was to ensure that the FCPA influenced American firms’ business methods.  Id. 
 33. See Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid 
Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 442–43 (2010) (noting that 
aside from the break-in at the Watergate complex, the Nixon administration engaged in several 
other illegal activities).  John Dean, the White House Counsel during the Nixon Administration, 
compiled an extensive list of illegal activities surreptitiously committed by the Nixon White 
House.  John W. Dean, III, Watergate: What Was It?, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 609, 646–48 (2000).  
Other illegal activities included a planned burglary of the Brookings Institute, endeavoring to 
wiretap journalists and White House staff to anticipate potential news leaks, and the possible sale 
of ambassadorships.  Id. 
 34. See Theodore C. Sorensen, Improper Payments Abroad: Perspectives and Proposals, 54 
FOREIGN AFF. 719, 719 (1976) (“Indeed the seeds of the present furor were sown in Watergate.”).  
According to former White House Special Counsel Ted Sorensen, it was Watergate that led to 
“pitiless exposure for all suspect practices connected with [the] government.”  Id.  At the time, 
this intense scrutiny had the unintended effect of influencing bribery in the black market.  Id.  
Some foreign officials reduced their rates due to a fear of exposure, and others commanded 
higher rates as they learned what influence their positions carried.  Id. 
Although the eruption of the Watergate scandal exposed one foreign dimension of the Nixon 
administration’s “suspect practices,” another foreign dimension may have led to the Watergate 
burglary in the first place.  Purportedly, among one of the reasons for the break-in was that it was 
intended to uncover what the Democrats knew about the Nixon campaign’s receipt of 
contributions from the junta in power in Greece from 1968 to 1974.  Robert Parry, Watergate 
Prosecutors Weighed Case Against Nixon Fund-Raiser, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 24, 1986, 
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1986/Watergate-Prosecutors-Weighed-Case-Against-Nixon-Fund 
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Nixon administration created a number of overseas ‘slush funds’ to channel 
illegal contributions to Nixon’s re-election bid and other political campaigns, 
as well as to provide for international bribery.35  As a result, numerous U.S. 
corporations were criminally prosecuted and accused of paying into these slush 
funds. 36   Several years after Nixon’s resignation, the SEC conducted a 
voluntary disclosure program that allowed U.S. corporations to self-report 
securities law violations and avoid SEC enforcement actions.37  More than five 
hundred U.S. companies disclosed “questionable payments” made to foreign 
government officials.38  Congress, concerned about damage to the reputation of 
American businesses resulting from corrupt business practices, passed the 
FCPA in 1977.39 
2.  The Anti-Bribery and Accounting Provisions of the FCPA 
The FCPA contains two major provisions—the anti-bribery provisions40 and 
the accounting provisions.41  Essentially, the anti-bribery provisions prohibit 
payments (or promises to pay) by a company or an individual to an official or 
an employee of a foreign government or an instrumentality in order to compel 
that official to influence government action or otherwise secure an improper 
                                                                                                                 
-Raiser/id-9022f82c23ef7572d9a89b8ec3a792dd.  One such contribution of $15,000 was 
funneled to the Nixon campaign by a Greek-American, Thomas A. Pappas, who also sat on 
Nixon’s re-election committee.  Id.  Although Congress did not intend to prevent such foreign 
bribery in the FCPA, it may be more than a mere coincidence that the FCPA arose out of such 
events. 
 35. H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments to the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Does the Government’s Reach Now Exceed its Grasp?, 26 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 239, 241 n.15 (2001); Thomas, supra note 33, at 442–43. 
 36. See Brown, supra note 35, at 241 n.15 (stating that twenty-two companies were 
prosecuted). 
 37. Id. at 243; Thomas, supra note 33, at 443. 
 38. Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption: The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 87 (2007); Thomas, supra note 33, at 443.  A 1976 SEC report 
lists well-known corporations that voluntarily disclosed improper foreign payments.  STAFF OF 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 94TH CONG., REP. ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL PAYMENTS AND 
PRACTICES SUBMITTED TO S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. AND URBAN AFFAIRS, Exs. A & B 
(Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter SEC PAYMENTS REP.].  For example, Baxter Labs, Carnation, 
Exxon, Johnson & Johnson and Pfizer all disclosed improper payments to foreign officials.  Id. at 
Exs. A-2, -4, -5, -7.  Also during this same period of disclosures, several major corporations 
settled SEC actions filed against them for improper foreign payments.  Id. at Ex. B.  Included 
among them were Ashland Oil Incorporated, Gulf Oil Corporation, and Northrop Corporation.  
Id. at B-3 to B-4, -7, -16 to -18.  Recently, Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay a criminal fine of 
$21.4 million for FCPA violations by its subsidiaries in Greece, Poland, and Romania.  Johnson 
& Johnson Agrees to Pay $21.4 Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act and Oil for Food Investigations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 8, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/ pr/2011/April/11-crm-446.html. 
 39. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 1 (1998). 
 40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, dd-2,  dd-3 (2006). 
 41. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2006). 
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advantage for the briber. 42   The accounting provisions 43  act to prevent 
corporations from falsifying their books and records in order to hide improper 
payments. 44   The SEC is the primary enforcer of the books and records 
provisions,45 unless a knowing violation occurs.46  In caseswhere there is a 
knowing violation, the DOJ has jurisdiction.47 
                                                 
 42. See, e.g., § 15 U.S.C. 78dd-2(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern . . . to 
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in 
furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any  
money . . . to . . . any foreign official for purposes of . . . (i) influencing any act or decision of 
such foreign official in his official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do 
any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii) securing any improper advantage.”). 
 43. 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(b)(2), (4)–(5). 
 44. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-831, at 10 (1977) (explaining that Congress intended the 
statute’s accounting provisions to ensure issuers “make and keep books, records, and accounts 
which accurately and fairly reflect the transaction and dispositions [sic] of the assets of the 
issuer.”).  Congress hoped to “prevent off-the-books slush funds and payments of bribes” that 
were so troublesome in the post-Watergate era.  Id. 
 45. See Raymond J. Dowd, Civil Rico Misread: The Judicial Repeal of the 1990 
Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 14 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 946, 950 (1991).  The 
accounting provisions have a number of severe penalties.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(i)–(iii).  
Civil penalties assessed can be up to $100,000 for a “natural person” and up to $500,000 for “any 
other person.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii)(I).  A “natural person” means a human being.  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 (9th ed. 2009).  “Any other person” refers to artificial persons 
such as corporations.  See BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY 331 (4th ed. 1996) (explaining that the 
term “natural person” does not include corporate entities and the term “person” by itself may or 
may not include corporations). 
A court may also order disgorgement of profits for violations of the accounting provisions.  See, 
e.g., SEC v. Lorin, 76 F.3d 458, 462 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (ordering disgorgement); SEC v. 
K.W. Brown & Co., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“A federal district court’s 
authority to order disgorgement in a SEC enforcement action is well established.”); SEC v. 
Intelliquis Int’l, Inc., No. 02-CV-674, 2003 WL 23356426, at *21 (D. Utah Dec. 11, 2003) 
(ordering the disgorgement of profits for a violation of section 78m among other sections of the 
Securities Exchange Act).  Disgorgement is defined as “[t]he act of giving up something . . . on 
demand or by legal compulsion.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 536 (9th ed. 2009). 
 46. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(4)–(5) (stating that criminal liability is imposed where a  
“person . . . knowingly circumvent[s] or knowingly fail[s] to implement a system of internal 
accounting controls or knowingly falsif[ies] any book, record, or account . . . .”).   The mens rea 
element requires the intent to falsify books and records.  See, e.g., United States v. Jensen, 532 F. 
Supp. 2d  1187, 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that a section 78m(b)(5) violation requires the 
government to prove that the defendant knew that the act of falsifying the books and records itself 
was wrongful, not that the act was a violation of the Exchange Act); see also S. REP. NO. 95-114, 
at 9 (1977) (explaining knowing conduct must be “rooted in a conscious undertaking to falsify 
records or mislead auditors” and that this mens rea leaves no refuge for the willfully blind). 
 47. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 9 (1977) (explaining that criminal violations of the FCPA 
are to be handled by the DOJ).  If the SEC has collected sufficient evidence for a criminal 
prosecution, it will refer the matter to the DOJ.  S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 11–12. 
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i.  The Anti-Bribery Provisions of the FCPA—Home of Foreign Officials 
and Instrumentalities 
The three main sections of the anti-bribery provisions apply to issuers of 
securities,48 domestic concerns,49 and foreign nationals.50  “Issuers” are defined 
as companies that either have a class of securities registered with the SEC or 
are required to file reports with that agency. 51   “Domestic concerns” are 
citizens of the United States and U.S. companies that either have their principal 
place of business within the United States or are organized under the laws of 
the United States.52  “Issuers” and “domestic concerns” are prohibited from 
having certain third parties make corrupt payments on their behalf.53  The  
anti-bribery provisions’ third section mirrors the preceding two sections and 
completes the broad sweep of the statute.54  Specifically, this section prohibits 
                                                 
 48. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2006). 
 49. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (2006). 
 50. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (2006). 
 51. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (stating that section 78dd-1 applies to “any issuer which has a 
class of securities registered pursuant to section 78l . . . or which is required to file reports under 
section 78o(d). . . .”).  A security on a national securities exchange must be registered with the 
SEC.  15 U.S.C. § 78l(a) (2006).  The code requires an issuer to file reports if it has securities 
registered with the SEC.  15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2006). 
 52. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(A)–(B).  Specifically, the section applies to “any individual 
who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States” and “any corporation, partnership, 
association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole 
proprietorship” whose principal place of business is in the United States or a U.S. territory.  Id. 
 53. 15 U.S.C §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a).  These sections specifically prohibit the “officer[s], 
director[s], employee[s], or agent[s]” and “any stockholder[s] . . . acting on behalf” of any issuers 
and domestic concerns.  Id. 
 54. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a).  This section applies the Act’s prohibitions to “any person other 
than an issuer . . . or a domestic concern . . . while in the territory of the United States.”  Id.  This 
section was part of the FCPA’s 1998 Amendments that incorporated the requirements of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention).  S. REP. NO. 
105-277, at 2–3 (1998).  The OECD Convention required the treaty’s parties to bar foreign 
bribery by “any person.”  Id. at 2.  Prior to the 1998 Amendments, the FCPA covered only 
domestic parties involved in foreign bribery.  Id. at 2–3.  The text of the OECD Convention 
explained that all parties agreed to 
take such measures . . . to establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any 
person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, 
whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official 
or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the 
performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper 
advantage in the conduct of international business. 
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CONVENTION ON 
COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS, art. 1, ¶ 1, Dec. 17, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-43, 37 I.L.M 1 (1998) 
[hereinafter OECD CONVENTION] (emphasis added).  In order to conform the FCPA with the 
treaty’s language, Congress expanded the statute’s jurisdiction to include foreign nationals 
furthering acts of foreign bribery within U.S. territory.  S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 2–3. 
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corrupt payments and promises to pay made by foreign nationals and 
companies while within U.S. territory.55  The FCPA’s expanded scope leaves 
no party out of the statute’s reach.56   In addition to direct payments, the  
anti-bribery provisions each proscribe payments made to third parties “while 
knowing” that some or all of the payments will go to a foreign official.57 
The DOJ and the SEC share the enforcement responsibilities of the  
anti-bribery provisions.58  The DOJ is responsible for the statute’s criminal 
enforcement as well as civil enforcement of the provisions related to domestic 
concerns and foreign parties.59  The SEC is responsible for civil enforcement 
of the provision affecting issuers, and it must refer all criminal FCPA matters 
involving issuers to the DOJ. 
ii.  Penalties Under the FCPA 
Although the FCPA has a dedicated set of penalties,60 actual penalties for an 
FCPA violation can extend beyond the statute’s requirements. 61   The 
intimidating nature of potential FCPA penalties led Siemens, a large European 
engineering company, to settle parallel FCPA enforcement proceedings with 
the DOJ and the SEC for $800 million in 2008.62 
Criminal violations of the anti-bribery provisions carry a fine up to $2 
million and a possible five-year prison term. 63   Willful violations by 
individuals may be punished with fines up to $5 million and jail time up to 
                                                 
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a).  The definitions of this section expand the statute’s jurisdictional 
reach to “any natural person other than a national of the United States” or any business entity 
“organized under the law of a foreign nation . . . .”  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(f)(1) (emphasis added). 
 56. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 2–3.  The FCPA reflects the language of the OECD Convention.  
Paragraph 1, Article I of the Convention sets out the “any person” language, while paragraph 1, 
Article 4 urges signing parties to exercise jurisdiction over persons committing bribes within their 
territory.  OECD CONVENTION, supra note 54, at art. 1, ¶ 1 and art. 4 ¶ 1.  These two paragraphs 
form the basis of 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3.  H.R. REP. 105-802, at 21 (1998). 
 57. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3), -3(a)(3) (2006) (setting forth the ban on 
payments by issuers, domestic concerns, and foreign citizens within the United States to third 
parties while knowing that all or part of that payment will ultimately go to a foreign official). 
 58. Lay Person’s Guide, supra note 31, at 2. 
 59. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 9 (1977) (outlining the DOJ’s responsibility for criminal 
prosecution of FCPA violations); Lay Person’s Guide, supra note 32, at 2.  Because the acts 
covered by section 78dd-3 are the same as those in sections 78dd-1 and dd-2, by extension, the 
DOJ’s prosecutorial authority also covers those foreign nationals alleged to have criminally 
violated section 78dd-3.  See S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 4 (discussing how 15 U.S.C. 78dd-3 
eliminates the preferential treatment that foreign nationals used to enjoy under the statute). 
 60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g), -3(e), 78ff(c) (2006). 
 61. See Gary Eisenberg, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 595, 610–12 
(2000) (describing how FCPA penalties are set at a baseline but can change based on aggravating 
factors). 
 62. Leslie Wayne, Hits, and Misses In a War on Bribery, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2012, at 6. 
 63. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(A), (2)(A); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-3(e)(1)(A), (2)(A); 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78ff(c)(1)(A), (2)(A) (setting out criminal penalties for various provisions of the 
FCPA). 
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twenty years, while an entity may be punished with fines up to $25 million.64  
Civil violations of the anti-bribery provisions carry fines up to $100,000 for 
entities and up to $10,000 for individual violators.65 
The penalties in the statute’s language, however, are only part of the full 
picture.  The DOJ’s real punitive firepower is derived from 18 U.S.C.  
§ 3571(d), which covers fines based on monetary gain or loss.66  If a defendant 
derives a monetary gain from an FCPA violation, or a third party loses money 
due to the defendant’s FCPA violation, section 3571 authorizes a penalty of 
twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss.67  This means that a defendant who 
made a significant profit through foreign bribery could face a penalty that 
greatly exceeds the FCPA’s statutory limits.68 
B.  New Lexicon: Subsequent Amendments and Just Who Is a “Foreign 
Official?” 
Much concern over the FCPA centers on the lack of clarity in the definition 
of foreign official.69  The FCPA broadly defines a foreign official as officials 
of a foreign government and its related entities, government agents, and 
officials of public international organizations, such as the United Nations.70  
                                                 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). 
 65. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(B), (2)(B) (providing the civil penalties for DOJ FCPA 
enforcement actions against domestic concerns); §§ 78dd-3(e)(1)(B), 2(B) (setting out civil 
penalties in FCPA enforcement actions against foreign individuals); 15 U.S.C.  
§§ 78ff(c)(1)(B), 2(B) (setting out civil penalties available in SEC FCPA enforcement actions 
against issuers and their agents). 
 66. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006). 
 67. Id.  Siemens A.G., the German engineering conglomerate, is the most notorious example 
of the steep penalties under section 3571, paying more than $440 million in criminal penalties 
under section 3571’s pecuniary gain provisions.  See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Siemens 
A.G. for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), available at www.sec.gov/news 
/press/2008/2008-294.htm. 
 68. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d); see, e.g., United States v. Pfaff, 619 F.3d 172, 174–75 (2d Cir. 
2010) (per curiam) (noting that section 3571(d) permits a court to assess an alternative fine that 
may exceed the statutory maximum only if a jury finds that there was a pecuniary gain or loss); 
United States v. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 655, 682 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (noting that 
section 3571(d) allows a departure from a statutory maximum fine when the offense causes a 
pecuniary loss or gain); United States v. Ferranti, 928 F. Supp. 206, 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting 
that departure from the statutory maximum is permissible when an offense results in a monetary 
loss or gain). 
 69. See House Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 3, at 3 (“One of the problems is the 
contention that the Justice Department and the SEC are interpreting the definition of ‘foreign 
official’ too broadly, especially when it comes to payments to companies that are state owned or 
state controlled.”); see also id. at 20 (testimony of the Hon. Michael B. Mukasey, former U.S. 
Att’y Gen., Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP) (“The FCPA prohibits corrupt payments or 
offers of payment to foreign officials, but it does not provide adequate guidance as to who is a 
foreign official.  The term is defined to include any officer or employee of a foreign government 
or any instrumentality thereof, but the FCPA doesn’t define what an instrumentality is.”). 
 70. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f), -2(h), -3(f) (2006).  In the 1998 Amendments to the FCPA, 
Congress expanded the definition of foreign official to comport with OECD Convention 
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However, despite an increase in enforcement, this definition still remains 
unclear, confusing practitioners and businesses conducting business abroad.71 
The FCPA’s legislative history suggests that the definition of a foreign 
official originally did not include all government employees, unlike  
present-day DOJ and SEC interpretations.72  The House of Representatives’ 
original intent—to which the Senate acceded—was that the foreign official 
definition was to include officers, employees, and agents of a government and 
its related branches.73  Although the FCPA states that foreign official includes 
any employee of a government or instrumentality, the House did not intend for 
foreign officials to include “employees whose duties were primarily ministerial 
or clerical.” 74   Thus, at the time of the FCPA’s enactment, payments to 
ministerial officers would not be prohibited.75 
In 1988, Congress revised the FCPA to exempt payments to clerical 
employees made for the purpose of expediting an action that the employee 
would ordinarily take in the course of his duties. 76   These payments are 
                                                                                                                 
requirements.  S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3 (1998).  The definition was revised to include officers of 
public international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) or World Health Organization 
(WHO).  Id.; see also H.R. REP. 105-802, at 29 (1998) (defining the terms “foreign official” and 
“public international organization”).  The Senate history of the 1998 Amendments stated that 
Congress would define public international organizations as those designated by Executive Order 
pursuant to the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA).  S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3.  
The United Nations received public international organization status in 1946.  Exec. Order No. 
9,698, 3 C.F.R. Supp. 508–09 (1943–1948).  The World Health Organization received public 
international organization status in 1948.  Exec. Order. No. 10,025, 13 Fed. Reg. 9361 (Dec. 30, 
1948). 
Although the FCPA’s final amended version included “any officer or employee” of a public 
international organization as part of its definition of a foreign official, the legislative history of 
the 1998 Amendments shows that Congress intended a narrower scope, mentioning only 
“officials.”  Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), with S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3. 
 71. See Cohen et al., supra note 30, at 1243, 1245, 1250 (arguing that it is unclear whether 
the term foreign official encompasses employees of foreign companies that are state-owned or 
state-controlled and explaining that the lack of DOJ and SEC guidance creates difficulties for 
companies conducting business abroad). 
 72. H.R. REP. NO. 94-831, at 12 (1977) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that the term did not include 
employees whose duties were ministerial or clerical in nature). 
 73. See id. (explaining that the original House definition—with which the Senate  
agreed—of a foreign official was “any officer or employee of a foreign government or any 
department, agency or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official capacity for or 
on behalf of such government, department, agency or instrumentality”). 
 74. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977).  A ministerial officer is “[o]ne who 
performs specified legal duties when the appropriate conditions have been met, but who does not 
exercise personal judgment or discretion in performing those duties.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1086 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). 
 75. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-831, at 12. 
 76. Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and The Culture of Bribery: Expanding The 
Scope of Private Whistleblower Suits To Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 425, 436 
(2009); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b), -2(b), -3(b) (2006). 
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commonly referred to as “grease” or “facilitating” payments.” 77   These 
payments are “exception[s] for routine governmental action.”78  The legislative 
history of the 1998 amendments refers to such “routine” actions as 
discretionary authority to award new business or maintain existing business.79 
Just as the definition of foreign official has fluctuated in the past, the 
definition of an “instrumentality” also remains nebulous.80  This is problematic 
because every employee of a foreign government instrumentality may be 
considered a foreign official.81  The DOJ and the SEC have taken advantage of 
this murkiness and pushed the definition of foreign official to its maximum 
limits.82 
Intertwined with the definition of a foreign official is the definition of a 
foreign government “instrumentality.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“instrumentality” as “[a] means or agency through which a function of another 
entity is accomplished, such as a branch of a governing body.”83  Courts use 
                                                 
 77. See Vega, supra note 76, at 436.  The House conference emphasized that the  
grease-payment exception would not apply to any discretionary action by a foreign official where 
that action resulted an improper business advantage.  See H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 921 (1988) 
(Conf. Rep.).  This amendment also enumerated the set of official actions for which grease 
payments are permissible.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A)(i)–(v), -2(h)(4)(A)(i)–(v), -
3(f)(4)(A)(i)–(v) (listing the permissible “routine governmental action[s]” for which an individual 
or entity may make grease payments to a foreign official). 
 78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), -2(b), -3(b); see United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 747 (5th 
Cir. 2004) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977)) (explaining that grease payments involved 
no misuse of an official’s discretion and that they were meant simply to “move a particular matter 
toward an eventual act or decision”). 
 79. See H.R. REP. 105-802, at 37 (1998) (“The term ‘routine governmental action’ does not 
include any decision by a foreign official . . . to award new business to or to continue business 
with a particular party . . . .”). 
 80. Cohen et al., supra note 30, at 1250 (stating that the DOJ and the SEC have declined to 
provide any guidance on what an instrumentality is).  Since many FCPA enforcement actions end 
either in a settlement or as DPAs, these settlements are used as quasi-case law for compliance 
with the statute.  See Mike Koehler, The FCPA, Foreign Agents, and Lessons from the 
Halliburton Enforcement Action, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 457, 457 (2010) (discussing how the lack 
of substantive case law on the FCPA makes settlements under the act noteworthy for determining 
legal precedent).  Certain settled SEC actions involved instrumentalities such as state-owned 
“corporations, railways, or airlines.”  Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal 
Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 
574–77 (2011).  However, Professor Westbrook has suggested that, in the case of subsidiaries 
whose ownership is several links removed from the government, such entities should not qualify 
as instrumentalities.  Id. at 533. 
 81. See House Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 3, at 20 (statement of Hon. 
Michael Mukasey, Former Att’y Gen., Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP) (“The DOJ and the 
SEC considers [sic] everyone who works for an instrumentality, from the most senior executive to 
the most junior mailroom clerk, to be a foreign official.”). 
 82. Cohen et al., supra note 30, at 1243 (stating that the DOJ and the SEC interpret the 
foreign official definition to include employees of foreign state-owned or state-controlled 
entities). 
 83. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (9th ed. 2009). 
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this definition as a starting point when determining if a given foreign entity is a 
government instrumentality84 because the FCPA provides no guidance as to 
what constitutes an instrumentality.85  Yet, determining whether an entity is a 
government instrumentality permits courts to ascertain if the entity’s 
employees are, in fact, foreign officials under the FCPA.86 
C.  The DOJ and the SEC Provide Administrative “Guidance” on the FCPA 
Definitions 
1.  The DOJ’s FCPA Opinion Procedure Releases Present an Unclear 
Picture of an Instrumentality 
The DOJ permits individuals and companies to obtain the Attorney 
General’s opinion, known as an FCPA Opinion Procedure Release, to 
determine whether certain prospective conduct would violate the FCPA. 87  
This procedure encourages businesses to seek the DOJ’s opinion as a 
precautionary measure to protect themselves from committing FCPA 
violations.88  To utilize the procedure, an issuer or domestic concern must 
submit in writing “all relevant and material information” concerning the 
prospective transaction for which an FCPA Opinion is requested.89   Upon 
receipt of a request that meets the procedural requirements, the Attorney 
General or his or her representative will issue an opinion within thirty days.90  
The DOJ retains the right to pursue action.91 
                                                 
 84. See, e.g., United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09–00077–JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at *4 
(C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011) (using Black’s Law Dictionary’s “instrumentality” definition); see also 
United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (adopting the Black’s Law 
Dictionary definition of “instrumentality” that the defendants proffered in a case arising under the 
FCPA). 
 85. See Cohen et al., supra note 30, at 1249–50.  For example, the term instrumentality 
appears in section 78dd-2 under the definition of foreign official, but Congress made no attempt 
to further define what such an entity entails.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h) (2006). 
 86. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) (“The term ‘foreign official’ means any officer or 
employee of a foreign government or any . . . instrumentality thereof . . . or any person acting in 
an official capacity for or on behalf of any such . . . instrumentality . . . .”). 
 87. 28 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2010). 
 88. See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 67–68 (Testimony of Greg 
Andres, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (discussing how 
companies may use the Opinion Procedure to obtain advisory opinions for clarification as to 
whether certain conduct violates the FCPA). 
 89. 28 C.F.R. §§ 80.2, 80.4, 80.6 (2010). 
 90. 28 C.F.R. § 80.8 (2010). 
 91. Id. 
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i.  FCPA Opinion Procedure Release 93-01 
To date, no FCPA Opinion Procedure Release clearly defines an 
instrumentality.92  However, the DOJ has issued several instructive Opinion 
Procedure Releases that help clarify what qualifies as an instrumentality.  
Opinion Procedure Release 93-01, for example, declares that quasi-commercial 
entities 93  wholly owned and operated by a foreign government are 
instrumentalities under the FCPA.94  The opinion was based on a Texas-based 
American company that entered into a joint venture partnership with a  
state-owned business of a former Communist Bloc nation.95  Some of the joint 
venture directions were to be drawn from the foreign entity.96  The American 
partner, fearing FCPA repercussions, solicited a DOJ opinion to determine 
whether proposed monthly fees to a joint venture’s foreign directors would 
violate the statute.97  The company assured the DOJ that its payments to the 
foreign directors would be reimbursed by the foreign partner.98  The DOJ 
declared that the state-owned enterprise qualified as an instrumentality,99 but 
stated that it would not take enforcement action.100  The DOJ based its decision 
on the company’s reassurances that it would be reimbursed by the foreign 
partner for the directors’ fees.101 
                                                 
 92. According to Cohen et al., supra note 30, at 1251, the DOJ has issued twenty-seven 
opinion procedure releases over a fifteen year span (from 1993 through June 2008).  Of those 
twenty-seven releases, only three examine the definition of instrumentality.  Id.  Furthermore, 
those three releases relate only to government ownership in business enterprises and the most 
“recent” opinion release involving an instrumentality dates back to 1994.  Dep’t of Justice, 
Opinion Procedure Release 94-01, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 13, 1994), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ opinion/1994/9401.pdf [hereinafter FCPA OPR  
94-01]. 
 93. Cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 393 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a quasi-corporation and 
explaining that such entities are often public corporations with limited authority and powers). 
 94. Dep’t of Justice, Opinion Procedure Release 93-01, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 20, 1993), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/1993/9301.pdf [hereinafter FCPA OPR  
93-01]. 
 95. Id. at 1.  The commercial entity was wholly owned and operated by the foreign 
government.  Id.  The parties agreed that members of both the American side and the foreign side 
would comprise the joint venture’s board of directors.  Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.  The American partner indicated that it would initially pay the joint venture’s 
directors’ fees.  Id. 
 98. Id.  The American partner explained that the foreign partner would reimburse the fees 
paid either from the foreign side’s net profits derived from the joint venture or from other funds it 
possessed.  Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  The American side also made assurances that it would educate its foreign partners 
regarding FCPA compliance.  Id. 
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ii.  FCPA Opinion Procedure Release 94-01 
The following year, in Opinion Procedure Release 94-01, the DOJ declared 
that an individual officer of a foreign state-owned enterprise—acting in his 
personal and private capacity to contract—is a foreign official under the 
FCPA.102  The opinion was based on an American company that, through its 
foreign subsidiary, planned to set up manufacturing operations on land it 
purchased from a foreign state-owned enterprise.103  The American company 
wished to retain the private consulting services of the foreign enterprise’s 
general director for assistance with obtaining permits and negotiating with the 
local power company for electricity supply.104  Concerned that the general 
director’s consulting fees would violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, 
the American company requested the DOJ’s opinion.105  In its request, the 
company noted that the foreign general director made several assurances that 
the American company’s actions would not run afoul of the FCPA.106  The 
DOJ decided, however, that the director of the state-owned enterprise was a 
foreign official under the FCPA even though the foreign jurisdiction did not 
consider the director to be a foreign official.107  Ultimately, the DOJ elected 
not to pursue any enforcement action against the American company.108 
iii.  FCPA Opinion Procedure Release 08-01 
In some instances, the DOJ opinions do not explicitly state that the 
individual in question qualifies as a foreign official.109  In a 2008 opinion, a 
U.S. company requested a DOJ opinion regarding a foreign official as 
interpreted by previous opinion releases. 110   A U.S.-based Fortune 500 
                                                 
 102. FCPA OPR 94-01, supra note 92.  The facts of this case resemble the previous opinion 
release only to the extent that the foreign national was the general director of a state-owned 
enterprise.  Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. at 1–2. The general director, among other things, assured the American company 
that: (1) he would contract with the American company in his personal and private capacity; (2) 
he would not use his official position to influence any acts or decisions of the foreign 
government; and (3) that the consulting payments were legal under his nation’s law.  Id. 
 107. Id.  The DOJ’s disregard for the foreign jurisdiction’s laws in determining whether the 
director was a foreign official is particularly noteworthy. See id.  (“[T]he foreign attorney’s 
opinion is not dispositive, and we have considered the foreign individual to be a ‘foreign official’ 
under the statute.”). 
 108. Id. at 2. 
 109. See Dep’t of Justice, Opinion Procedure Release 08-01, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 15, 
2008), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2008/0801.pdf [hereinafter FCPA 
OPR 08-01] (declaring only that the DOJ does not plan to take any enforcement action and failing 
to mention whether the party in question is a foreign official). 
 110. Id.  The facts in this opinion are similar to the previous releases from the early 1990s 
insofar as they involve a party seeking to do business in a foreign country without violating the 
FCPA.  See supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text. 
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corporation wished to purchase a foreign government’s majority share in a 
local public services provider, divesting the government of its majority share 
and wholly privatizing the company.111  However, the general manager of the 
public services provider also held a minority share in the government entity.112 
The complicated prospective transaction would involve the minority 
shareholder’s purchase of the state-owned shares in the government company, 
fully privatizing that entity.113  Next, the American company would purchase a 
majority share from the minority owner.114  The American company requested 
the DOJ’s opinion on whether the minority owner/entity general manager 
would be considered a foreign official.115  Despite a lengthy discussion on the 
proposed transaction and associated due diligence, the DOJ did not opine on 
whether the minority owner was a foreign official and stated that it would not 
pursue an enforcement action.116  The opinion arguably implies that an official 
of an entity majority-owned by a foreign state is a foreign official, even prior 
to impending privatization.  
2.  The SEC’s Litigation Releases & Administrative Orders Further Shape 
the Contours of the Definitions of Foreign Official and Instrumentality  
The SEC litigation releases and administrative orders have further declared, 
albeit without clarity, who may be considered a foreign official and what may 
be an instrumentality.117  Particularly, these orders have addressed whether 
foreign physicians or foreign hospitals fall into either category. 
In 2002, the SEC settled an FCPA enforcement proceeding with Syncor 
International Corporation that involved bribes to foreign physicians employed 
by state-run medical facilities.118 The SEC found that, between the mid-1980s 
and late 2002, Syncor had made improper payments to physicians who 
controlled purchasing decisions in the nuclear-medicine departments of certain 
                                                 
 111. FCPA OPR 08-01, supra note 109, at 1–2.  The company’s minority shareholder was a 
foreign private company.  Id. at 2. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 3. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 4.  The U.S. company assured the DOJ that the U.S. company was concerned that 
the transaction could constitute payments to a foreign official.  Id. at 9–11.  The assurances 
emphasized the legitimate purpose of the payments in the prospective transaction.  Id.  The 
relevant assurances included: (1) the minority owner would not receive additional financing from 
the American company for the transaction; (2) the American company would not make any extra 
payments to the minority owner; (3) the minority owner’s premium for the shares in the entity 
would be based on legitimate business considerations; and (4) the minority owner’s status as a 
“foreign official” would soon cease.  Id. at 9–10. 
 116. Id. at 12. 
 117. See text accompanying infra notes 122, 127, 128 (noting how the SEC orders declare 
certain things to be instrumentalities without any explanation). 
 118. SEC v. Syncor Int’l Corp., Litigation Release No. 17887, 2002 WL 31761454 (Dec. 10, 
2002); see also Syncor Int’l Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 46979, 55 S.E.C. 1256 (Dec. 10, 
2002) (detailing Syncor’s anti-bribery violations in several state-run hospitals). 
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Taiwanese state-owned hospitals, 119  physicians employed by Mexican 
government-owned hospitals, 120  and physicians employed by state-owned 
hospitals in Belgium, Luxembourg, and France. 121  Without additional 
clarification or analysis, the SEC declared that the doctors were foreign 
officials and that the hospitals were instrumentalities under the FCPA. 122  
Despite the SEC’s broad declaration, Syncor consented to the issuance of an 
SEC administrative order that detailed these FCPA violations.123 
In a similar enforcement proceeding, the SEC issued a cease-and-desist 
order against Diagnostic Products Corporation (DPC) for violations of the  
anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.124  In October 1991, DPC entered into a 
joint venture with a local Chinese government entity; the new entity was 
named DePu Biotechnological & Medical Products Incorporated (DePu) and 
eventually became DPC’s wholly owned Chinese subsidiary.125  According to 
the SEC’s findings, DePu made illicit payments to physicians and laboratory 
employees over a span of eleven years in an effort to influence purchasing 
decisions in their respective foreign state-owned hospitals.126  As in the Syncor 
litigation release, the SEC declared that “the [physicians] who received 
improper payments from DePu were foreign officials within the meaning of the 
FCPA, and the hospitals were instrumentalities of a foreign government within 
the meaning of the FCPA.”127   Again, notwithstanding the SEC’s lack of 
explanation regarding foreign officials and instrumentalities, DPC consented to 
the issuance of the administrative order.128 
D.  Two California Cases Set Forth Multi-Factor Tests for the Instrumentality 
Determination 
Due to the increase in FCPA enforcement,129 the U.S. District Court for the  
 
                                                 
 119. Syncor, 55 S.E.C. at 1258 (stating that improper commissions totaled at least $400,000). 
 120. Id. at 1260 (detailing the methods used, which included unpaid loans and improper 
hospital invoices). 
 121. Id. at 1262. 
 122. Id. at 1264. 
 123. Id. at 1257. 
 124. Diagnostic Prods. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 51724, 2005 SEC LEXIS 1185, at 
*1 (May 20, 2005). 
 125. Id. at *2–3. 
 126. Id. at *3 (finding that payments totaled approximately $1.6 million from 1991 to 2002). 
 127. Id. at *4–5. 
 128. Id. at *1. 
 129. See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 63 (statement of Rep. Judy Chu, 
Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting that in 2004, the DOJ and the SEC brought a total 
of five enforcement actions, whereas in 2010, the DOJ and the SEC brought seventy-four 
enforcement actions); see also Year-by-Year SEC Enforcement Actions, SEC (2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/newsroom/images/enfstats.pdf (noting that in 2011, the SEC filed 
twenty FCPA enforcement actions). 
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Central District of California recently opined on the scope of an 
instrumentality.130 
1.  United States v. Aguilar 
In United States v. Aguilar [hereinafter Lindsey] two high-ranking 
employees of the Lindsey Manufacturing Company were charged with 
funneling bribes to high-level officials of a Mexican public utility, the 
Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE), in order to obtain contracts with the 
utility.131  The Lindsey defendants, in an attempt to dismiss the indictment, 
argued that the CFE’s status as a state-owned corporation meant that it did not 
qualify as an instrumentality under the FCPA.132 
The defense, utilizing two canons of statutory interpretation, argued that an 
instrumentality must share characteristics with agencies and departments—the 
neighboring statutory entities—by exercising and enforcing government 
policy.133  The Government countered by arguing that an instrumentality must 
cover the interstices between departments and agencies because, otherwise, the 
term “would be robbed of independent meaning.”134  The court was hesitant to 
                                                 
 130. See United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701 (C.D. Cal. 
May 18, 2011) (addressing the issue of whether state-owned companies fell under the FCPA’s 
definition of instrumentality); United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1113–20 (C.D. Cal. 
2011) (defining instrumentality for the purposes of finding liability under the FCPA). 
 131. 783 F. Supp. at 1108–12.  The case was eventually dismissed with prejudice for 
prosecutorial misconduct.  United States v. Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 2011) 
(order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment); see also C.M. Matthews, Lindsey 
Dismissal Stings, But Is Not an FCPA Rebuke, CORRUPTION CURRENTS (Nov. 30, 2011, 5:51 
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/11/30/lindsey-dismissal-stings-but-is-not-an 
-fcpa-rebuke/.  Lindsey Manufacturing was a privately-held company in California whose 
primary business was the manufacture and sale of equipment used by electrical utility companies.  
Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 1111.  Defendants Keith Lindsey and Steve Lee were the President 
and Vice President of the company respectively.  Id.  CFE was the public utility responsible for 
the supply of electricity to the entirety of Mexico, save for Mexico City.  Id. at 1110. 
 132. Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 1112–13 (stating that the defendants also argued that, 
logically, no employee would be considered a foreign official).  Noteworthy is the court’s 
strongly emphasized statement, “[t]he FCPA does not define ‘instrumentality.’”  Id. at 1112. 
 133. Id. at 1113–15.  The defendants utilized the statutory interpretation canons of noscitur a 
sociis and ejusdem generis.  Id.  The former principle requires the examination of a statutory term 
in context and by comparison to its neighboring terms.  Id. at 1113 n.5.  The latter principle 
provides that if a general term follows in a sequence of more specific terms, the general term is 
defined by analogy to the objects that the specific terms entail.  Id.  Applying these principles, the 
defendants argued that an instrumentality ought to share characteristics of agencies and 
departments, and that a corporation cannot be an instrumentality as it shares no such 
characteristics.  Id. at 1114. 
 134. Id. at 1114.  The Government rejected the defense’s all-or-nothing approach.  Id. at 
1115.  Instead, the government argued that an instrumentality could not entail only those entities 
that shared qualities with agencies and departments.  Id. at 1114.  Furthermore, the Government 
argued that if an instrumentality must share all of its characteristics with a department and an 
agency, it is moot to include the term “instrumentality” in the statute.  Id. 
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render an instrumentality a clone of a department or agency, noting that 
“[c]anons of statutory construction counsel against this outcome.”135 
Considering each side’s position on the definition of instrumentality, Judge 
A. Howard Matz of the Central District of California set forth a  
“non-exclusive” list of possible characteristics of an instrumentality:136 
[1] The entity provides a service to the citizens—indeed, in many 
cases to all the inhabitants—of the jurisdiction[;]  
[2] The key officers and directors of the entity are, or are appointed 
by, government officials[;] 
[3] The entity is financed, at least in large measure, through 
governmental appropriations or through revenues obtained as a result 
of government-mandated taxes, licenses, fees or royalties, such as 
entrance fees to a national park[;] 
[4] The entity is vested with and exercises exclusive or controlling 
power to administer its designated functions[;] 
[5] The entity is widely perceived and understood to be performing 
official (i.e., governmental) functions.137 
Applying these factors, the court determined that CFE had all of these 
characteristics of an instrumentality.138 
                                                 
 135. Id. at 1114.  
 136. Id. at 1115. 
 137. Id.  Notably, the final factor listed conflicts with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA).  See 23 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2006) (defining “agency of instrumentality” of a “foreign 
state”).  According to FSIA case law, a foreign instrumentality is an entity engaged in 
predominantly commercial, rather than governmental, government-supported activity.  See, e.g., 
Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1163–64 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (concluding that 
a Spanish art foundation engaged in sufficient commercial activity that was funded by the 
Spanish government qualified as an instrumentality), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 580 F.3d 1048 
(9th Cir. 2009); see also Karaha Bodas Co., v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi 
Negara (“Pertamina”), 313 F.3d 70, 75–76 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a wholly state-owned and 
operated oil and gas company is “an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state”).  Despite the 
contradiction in terms between FCPA instrumentality functions (governmental) and FSIA 
instrumentality functions (commercial), the outcome appears to be the same—a  
government-financed and government-operated entity that serves a population is an 
instrumentality. 
 138. United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2011).  Some of the 
listed factors also mirror the features that the OECD Convention Commentaries state a public 
enterprise should entail.  See Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Nov. 21, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 14, 15, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf (hereinafter OECD Convention 
Commentaries) (describing a public enterprise as government controlled when a government 
controls the company’s capital, its shareholders votes, or board of directors).  The court noted that 
Congress “embrace[d]” the OECD Convention despite excluding state-owned corporations from 
its instrumentality definition.  Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1117.  In addition, in determining CFE 
was a Mexican government instrumentality, the court emphasized factors two, four, and five and 
believed CFE’s constitutional and statutory origins, autonomy from the central government, and 
government-appointed leadership were persuasive.  Id. at 1115. 
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The court also examined the FCPA’s use of the term instrumentality as well 
as the statute’s legislative history.139 However, despite an in-depth analysis, the 
court found neither examination particularly helpful or necessary. 140  
Ultimately, the court reasoned that its factors, its interpretation of  
the legislative history, and a consideration of the Charming Betsy  
doctrine141—which states that U.S. law must not conflict with international law 
or agreements142—required it to deny the defense’s motion to dismiss the 
indictment.143 
2.  United States v. Carson 
One month after the Lindsey opinion was issued, Judge James V. Selna of 
the Central District of California also addressed the question of “whether  
state-owned companies qualify as instrumentalities under the FCPA.”144  In a 
case with many factual similarities to Lindsey, the defendants in United States 
v. Carson were charged with bribing several foreign state-owned power 
company officials throughout Asia and the Persian Gulf for the benefit of their 
employer, Controlled Components Incorporated (CCI).145  The defendants filed 
a motion to dismiss the FCPA counts of the indictment and argued that state-
owned employees were not foreign officials as understood by the FCPA 
because state-based companies were not departments, agencies, or foreign 
government instrumentalities.146 
                                                 
 139. Id. at 1115–20. 
 140. See id. at 1117–19 (describing a structural analysis of the FCPA as “unnecessary” and 
the legislative history as “inconclusive.”).  However, the court spent some time contemplating the 
government’s statutory-construction argument.  Id. at 1116–17.  Based on the doctrine derived 
from an 1804 U.S. Supreme Court case, the government argued that no construction of the FCPA 
could violate the government’s obligations under the OECD Convention.  Id. at 1116 (citing 
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)).  Because the OECD 
considers certain government-controlled organizations to fall within its definition of a “public 
enterprise,” the government argued, and the court agreed, that excluding state-owned corporations 
from the definition of instrumentality would violate the United States’ obligations under the 
OECD Convention.  Id. at 1116–17. 
 141. Relying, in part, on the Charming Betsy doctrine, the Aguilar court held that statutes are 
to be considered in a manner consistent with any international law or international agreement 
entered into on behalf of the United States.  Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1116 (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114 (1987)).  
Thus, the Aguilar court interpreted the FCPA in a way that would not impair the U.S. 
government’s obligations under the OECD Convention.  See id. at 1116–17 (discussing role of  
the Charming Betsy doctrine in the analysis of the definition of ‘instrumentality’). 
 142. See id. at 1116 (citing Murray, 6 U.S. at 118). 
 143. Id. at 120. 
 144. United States v. Carson, SACR 09–00077–JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 
May 18, 2011) (order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss counts one through ten of the 
indictment). 
 145. Id. at *1–2. 
 146. Id. at *1. 
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The arguments advanced by the defense in Carson were similar to those 
advanced in Lindsey.147  However, the court in Carson resolved that it could 
not decide as a matter of law whether a state-owned company was an 
instrumentality.148  Rather, the court concluded that a jury should ascertain 
whether a state-owned company may be considered an instrumentality.149  To 
assist with this factual determination, the court set forth a list of non-exclusive 
factors to supplement the comparable list enumerated in Lindsey.150  These 
factors require the parties to present evidence that demonstrates: 
[1] The foreign state’s characterization of the entity and its 
employees; 
[2] The foreign state’s degree of control over the entity; 
[3] The purpose of the entity’s activities; 
[4] The entity’s obligations and privileges under the foreign state’s 
law, including whether the entity exercises exclusive or controlling 
power to administer its designated functions; 
[5] The circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation; and 
[6] The foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity, including 
the level of financial support by the state (e.g., subsidies, special tax 
treatment, and loans).151 
Next, the court examined the FCPA’s statutory text and determined that 
instrumentalities include entities that are not “agencies” or “departments,” but 
that do carry out government functions.152  Similar to the Lindsey court, the 
Carson court stated that the definition of instrumentality could not 
categorically exclude state-owned companies. 153   The court explained that 
although evidence of a government’s monetary investment into a business 
entity is insufficient to define that entity as an instrumentality, evidence of that 
investment, coupled with evidence indicating that an entity is carrying out 
                                                 
 147. See id. at *8 (“In Aguilar . . . defendants made virtually identical arguments to those 
made here. . . .”).  The arguments advanced were based on a statutory analysis designed to 
exclude state-owned companies from the definition of instrumentality.  Id.  The defendants even 
advanced a noscitur a sociis defense to restrict “instrumentality” to a very narrow meaning.  Id. at 
*5.  This was rejected by the court because construction of a statutory term requires consideration 
of the entire statute.  Id.  The court stated that Congress meant for an instrumentality to 
encompass entities that an “agency” or “department” does not cover.  Id. 
 148. Id. at *3. 
 149. See id. at *9 (concluding that state-owned companies generally may be encompassed by 
the term “instrumentality,” but that a jury must decide whether a specific business qualifies). 
 150. Id. at *3–4. 
 151. Id.  These factors also mirror the OECD Convention Commentaries’ description of a 
state-owned enterprise.  See supra note 138. 
 152. Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *4–5. 
 153. Id. at *5. 
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government functions, 154  would suffice to characterize that entity as an 
instrumentality.155 
The court also looked to domestic examples of instrumentalities to bolster its 
point that a state-owned corporation such as the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) or the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) could qualify as 
an instrumentality.156  Additionally, the court examined the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act—another statute containing the term instrumentality in its 
language—to demonstrate that corporations can be instrumentalities. 157  
Ultimately, the court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment 
because it could not determine as a matter of law that a state-owned 
corporation was an instrumentality.158 
II.  THE FCPA REQUIRES REFINEMENT IN THE FACE OF THE CURRENT 
ENFORCEMENT TREND 
The FCPA is a broad statute which requires the compliance of overseas 
businesses. 159   Anyone doing business abroad—including foreign nationals 
employed by U.S. companies and their subsidiaries—is subject to the FCPA’s 
                                                 
 154. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2011) 
(explaining that the provision of electricity in Mexico constitutes a “quintessential government 
function”); see also Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *6 (providing examples of state-owned 
entities that carry out government functions, such as rail transport or regional economic 
development). 
 155. See Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *5. 
 156. See id. at *6 (explaining that the United States has historically utilized corporations to 
carry out government goals). 
 157. See id. at *7 (arguing that because Congress passed the FSIA a year before the FCPA, 
the inclusion of state-owned corporation under the definition of instrumentality in the FSIA helps 
to support the conclusion that instrumentalities under the FCPA may include a state-owned 
company).  The court examined the FSIA because that statute includes state-owned corporations 
in its definition instrumentalities.  Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) (2006) (“An ‘agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state’ means any entity . . . which is a separate legal person, corporate 
or otherwise, . . . a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign 
state or political subdivision thereof . . . .”).  The defense argued that Congress previously defined 
instrumentality to entail state-owned corporations, and that by excluding said entities from the 
FCPA, Congress intended the exclusion from the FCPA’s definition of an instrumentality.  
Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *7.  The court was unconvinced, noting that the doctrine of 
statutory interpretation by which an omission of particular language that appears elsewhere in the 
statue is done intentionally by Congress only applies intra-statutorily, not inter-statutorily.  Id.  
Therefore, the exclusion of a phrase in the FCPA indicating that an instrumentality could include 
a state-owned company is not presumed to be an intentional or purposeful exclusion by Congress.  
Id. 
 158. Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *3, 9, 11. 
 159. See supra Part I (discussing the ways in which various institutions have interpreted the 
FCPA’s foreign official and instrumentality terms and analyzing how this has caused difficulty 
for business owners seeking to ascertain a standard under the statute). 
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prohibitions.160  Additionally, the DOJ and the SEC are currently engaged in a 
record-breaking enforcement campaign,161 and despite recent setbacks,162 those 
agencies have promised to continue strong enforcement.163 
Despite such stringent enforcement and broad jurisdiction, the FCPA’s 
administrative guidance and interpretive case law pales in comparison with 
other statutes.164  This creates a difficult choice for businesses with overseas 
operations: either enter into risky business arrangements abroad with 
individuals or entities who have unclear connections to a foreign government, 
or conduct business conservatively and risk losing a competitive edge by 
eschewing foreign markets.165 
A.  The Plain Meaning of the FCPA and Its Legislative History Do Not Support 
the DOJ’s and the SEC’s Interpretations of Foreign Officials and 
Instrumentalities 
1.  The Original Act’s Legislative History Indicates Congress’s Intent to 
Limit the Definition of Foreign Officials 
The legislative history of the original FCPA enacted in 1977 indicates that 
Congress wanted the statute to cover only those bribes made to a government 
                                                 
 160. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (2006) (prohibiting foreign nationals and corporations from 
engaging in bribery while in U.S. territory). 
 161. See Westbrook, supra note 80, at 522–23 (providing statistics demonstrating a dramatic 
increase in FCPA enforcement actions brought by the DOJ and the SEC from 2007 to 2010). 
 162. See C.M. Matthews, Houston Judge Tosses Foreign Bribery Case, Hands DOJ New 
Setback, CORRUPTION CURRENTS (Jan. 17, 2012 12:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com 
/corruption-currents/2012/01/17/houston-judge-tosses-foreign-bribery-case-hands-doj-new-setbac 
k/ (explaining that the defendant’s FCPA indictment was dismissed because the judge found the 
government’s chief witness unreliable); C.M. Matthews, Judge Dismisses Landmark Bribery 
Conviction, Rips DOJ, CORRUPTION CURRENTS (Dec. 1, 2011, 6:57 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/12/01/judge-dismisses-landmark-bribery-convictio 
n-rips-doj/ (explaining that the Lindsey conviction was dismissed due to gross prosecutorial 
misconduct); C.M. Matthews, Justice Dept. Drops FCPA Sting Case, WSJ LAW BLOG (Feb. 21, 
2012, 11:56 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/02/21/justice-dept-drops-fcpa-sting-ca 
se/ (explaining that, in light of several mistrials and acquittals, the DOJ would decline to further 
prosecute sixteen defendants ensnared in an FCPA sting operation). 
 163. Jenna Greene, Agency Officials Say Feds Remain Committed to FCPA Enforcement, 
THE BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Mar. 8, 2012, 3:30 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad 
.com/blt/2012/03/agency-officials-say-feds-remain-committed-to-fcpa-enforcement.html (quoting 
the DOJ Fraud Department Assistant Chief as saying “We’re in this for the long haul”). 
 164. See Matthew J. Kovacich, Backyard Business Going Global: The Consequences of 
Increased Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) on Minnesota and 
Wisconsin, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 529, 537–38 (2009) (explaining how key terms in the FCPA lack 
definition and that there is a dearth of binding precedent interpreting the statute’s terms). 
 165. Cf. House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 20 (statement of the Hon. Michael 
Mukasey, Former Att’y Gen., Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP) (emphasizing that a lack of 
clarity in the statutory terms makes it difficult for companies to determine what constitutes 
permissible conduct). 
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official or employee who carry out a government function.166  Further, the 
House of Representatives, by initially excluding employees with ministerial or 
clerical duties from the law’s prohibitions, did not intend for every government 
employee to qualify as a foreign official.167  Rather, the House understood the 
realities of doing business abroad and meant “foreign official” to encompass 
only those individuals whose authority was susceptible to corruption.168 
The Senate’s acceptance of the House’s foreign official definition supports 
the argument that Congress intended a restrained definition.169  The decision to 
use the word government “officials” rather than “employees” indicates that 
Congress wished to criminalize bribes to individuals with decision-making 
authority to execute a government function.170  Congress believed that those 
functions, when exercised, could secure a business advantage and potentially 
be corruptible. 171  However, ministerial officers have no discretion that is 
corruptible 172  because corruption entails the gain of an advantage through 
dereliction of that discretion.173  Congress, realizing this reality, intended to 
                                                 
 166. H.R. REP. NO. 95-831, at 12 (1997) (Conf. Rep.). 
 167. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977) (indicating that the proscribed payments 
would be those made to foreign officials with influence over other officials or branches of 
government). 
 168. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8.  In particular, the legislative history notes that, 
While payments made to assure or to speed the proper performance of a foreign 
official’s duties may be reprehensible in the United States, the committee recognizes 
that they are not necessarily so viewed elsewhere in the world . . . As a result, the 
committee has not attempted to reach such payments.  However, where the payment is 
made to influence the passage of law, regulations, the placement of government 
contracts, the formulation of policy or other discretionary governmental functions, such 
payments would be prohibited. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 169. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-831, at 12 (stating that the Senate receded to the House’s 
definition of foreign official, which excluded those employees with ministerial or clerical duties); 
see also Jon Jordan, The OECD’s Call for an End to “Corrosive” Facilitation Payments and the 
International Focus on the Facilitation Payments Exception Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 881, 889–90 (2011) (explaining that Congress intended this 
circumscription of “foreign official” to be the statute’s original “grease payments” exception). 
 170. See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 50–51 (written testimony of 
Shana-Tara Regon, Dir., Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers) (arguing that the FCPA’s original 
purpose neither comports with current government interpretations of mid-level officials as foreign 
officials nor with a layperson’s interpretation of what individuals would be considered true 
“officials”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (emphasizing that the reasoning behind the use 
of the adjective “corrupt” to describe the prohibited action and why this adjective cannot apply to 
ministerial officers). 
 171. Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8. (providing examples of corruptible official duties, such 
as directing business to the payor or obtaining preferential legislation).  Ministerial officers can 
only take actions that involve no discretion; they cannot secure a business advantage.  Id. 
 172. See id. (explaining that such duties involve no discretion and will occur in any event). 
 173. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 397 (9th ed. 2009) (“The act of doing something with an 
intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others”); see also 3 
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limit the term foreign official to those officials who have discretionary 
governmental authority.174 
2.  Subsequent FCPA Amendments Support a Narrow Reading of Foreign 
Official to Apply Only to Officials with Discretionary Authority 
Subsequent amendments to the FCPA demonstrate a hesitation to expand the 
definition of a foreign official, demonstrating a common thread of limiting the 
definition to those who possess some discretion to act. 175   The 1988 
Amendments, which created the grease payments exception,176 narrowed the 
original ministerial exception and stated that a payment to any foreign official 
with discretionary power could not qualify as a grease payment. 177   The 
legislative history of the 1998 Amendments, however, expanded the definition 
to incorporate officials of public international organizations.178  Although the 
amended statute’s final version prohibited bribes to officials and employees of 
foreign governments,179 the legislative history demonstrates an implied unease 
with any expansion of the definition of a foreign official.180 
3.  The Plain Meaning of Foreign Official and Instrumentality Do Not 
Support Broad Definitions 
The plain meanings of foreign official and instrumentality do not coincide 
with the broad, non-binding meanings that the DOJ and the SEC have ascribed 
to them.181  Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “official” as someone who is 
“elected or appointed to carry out some portion of a government’s sovereign 
powers”182 and an “instrumentality” as “[a] means or agency through which 
function of another entity is accomplished, such as a branch of a governing 
                                                                                                                 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 972 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “corrupt” as “[t]o destroy or pervert 
the integrity or fidelity of (a person) in his discharge of duty”). 
 174. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (explaining that the FCPA is violated when a payment to 
a government official is made to influence “the passage of law, regulation, the placement of 
government contracts, the formulation of policy, or other discretionary government functions”). 
 175. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 921 (1988) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that the grease payment 
exception does not apply to official actions involving an exercise of discretion by a government 
official); see also S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3 (1998) (stating that officials of public international 
organizations are to be included in the definition of foreign official). 
 176. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra note 77 (discussing how the 1988 Amendments limited acceptable grease 
payments to an enumerated list of actions). 
 178. See S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3. 
 179. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) (2006) (providing that the phrase foreign official 
includes “any officer or employee”). 
 180. Compare id. (defining officials of public international organizations to include their 
officers and employees), with H.R. REP. 105-802, at 21 (1998) (defining only the officials of a 
public international organization as foreign officials). 
 181. See supra Part I.C. 
 182. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (9th ed. 2009). 
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body.”183   The plain meaning of “official” connotes that the individual is 
tasked with carrying out a government function, like protecting the health and 
welfare of the nation.184  Similarly, a government “instrumentality” plainly 
means that the entity assists in the accomplishment of a government 
purpose. 185   However, the DOJ’s Opinion Procedure Releases focus on 
government-owned commercial entities.186  The DOJ appears more concerned 
with a government’s presence in an instrumentality than with whether the 
instrumentality carries out a government purpose.187  An entity must have both 
government presence and the ability to assist in exercising the government’s 
sovereign powers to be an instrumentality. 
B.  Lindsey and Carson Demonstrate Cautious, Yet Positive, Steps Toward 
Refined Definitions of Foreign Official and Instrumentality 
The cases from the Central District of California mark positive steps toward 
the creation of an analysis for determining what constitutes an 
instrumentality.188  In doing so, the Lindsey and Carson courts promulgate 
criteria that are altogether more restrictive and definite than the DOJ’s and the 
SEC’s expansive interpretations of the FCPA. 189   The courts’ inquiries 
centered on an instrumentality’s financing, level of government ownership, 
vested controlling power, and purpose.190  These inquiries mirrored some of 
the public enterprise features discussed in the commentaries of the OECD 
Convention. 191   Both the DOJ’s and the SEC’s interpretations of 
                                                 
 183. Id. at 870; see also 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1052 (2d ed. 1989) (“[T]he fact or 
function of serving or being used for the accomplishment of some purpose or end.”). 
 184. Cf. Benjamin Mason Meier & Larisa M. Mori, The Highest Attainable Standard: 
Advancing a Collective Human Right to Public Health, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 101, 133 
(2005) (noting that the WHO Constitution states that governments are responsible for protecting 
the public health and well-being). 
 185. Cf. House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 27 n.15 (statement of the Hon. 
Michael Mukasey, Former Att’y Gen., Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP) (analogizing the 
current definition of instrumentality to General Motors as an example of a ‘state-owned’ 
corporation: if the United States was a foreign government, GM would be an instrumentality).  
See Gen. Motors Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Apr. 7, 2010) (detailing the change of 
ownership from the former private-owned GM Corporation to the government-owned GM 
Company). 
 186. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 187. See supra Part I.C.1; see also, e.g., FCPA OPR 93-01, supra note 94 (declaring that a 
quasi-commercial entity wholly owned and operated by a foreign official is an instrumentality 
despite the organization’s primary purpose). 
 188. See supra Part I.D. 
 189. See supra Part I.D (noting that the majority opinions in Aguilar and Carson provide a 
non-exclusive list of factors to assist the jury in making a factual determination regarding whether 
a state-owned corporation is an instrumentality). 
 190. See text accompanying notes 137 and 141. 
 191. See OECD Convention Commentaries, supra note 138, at 15 (providing factual 
scenarios that help determine whether an enterprise is a public enterprise/instrumentality). 
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instrumentalities look only for the presence, not the degree, of government 
control/financing. 192   Although both courts ultimately accepted the 
government’s position that the entities in question were instrumentalities, the 
opinions demonstrate that the courts are unwilling to rule blindly.193  One such 
example is the Lindsey opinion’s focus on whether an instrumentality is 
“perceived and understood” to perform an official function.194  If a reasonable 
juror believes that the alleged instrumentality does not perform an official 
function, the entity may fall outside the instrumentality definition.195   For 
corporate counsel to the pharmaceutical industry, this factor will require 
examining the depth a government’s involvement with a hospital or research 
institute.  The perceptions of the local population will also indicate if the entity 
is a government instrumentality.196 This factor will serve as a beneficial asset 
to future counsel tasked with determining their client’s corporations’ FCPA 
liability. 
C.  The DOJ and the SEC Have Broadened the Meaning of Foreign Official 
and Instrumentality 
In stark contrast to the FCPA’s legislative history and the Lindsey and 
Carson decisions, the DOJ and the SEC have adopted expansive views of the 
terms foreign official and instrumentality in their non-binding administrative 
pronouncements.197  The DOJ Opinion Procedure Releases are unclear about 
the type of entity that will qualify as an instrumentality.198   Although the 
releases do indicate that the DOJ will look for state ownership when it 
examines if an entity—either explicitly or implicitly—is an instrumentality,199 
the agency is silent about the degree of government ownership necessary for 
                                                 
 192. Compare supra Part I.C (discussing the DOJ and SEC releases that declared certain 
entities to be instrumentalities without providing guidance regarding level of state ownership 
necessary for that determination), with supra Part I.D (discussing the factors applied by courts to 
examine the level of control and financing needed by the subject for it to be considered an 
instrumentality). 
 193. See supra Part I.D (describing the detailed list of factors promulgated by the Aguilar and 
Carson courts). 
 194. United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 195. See id. (listing whether the entity performs an official government function as one of the 
five non-exhaustive characteristics that are often common with an instrumentality). 
 196. See id. (noting that community perception and level of government involvement are 
among the important factors for determining whether an entity is an instrumentality under the 
FCPA). 
 197. See supra Part I.C. 
 198. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 199. See FCPA OPR 93-01, supra note 94, at 1 (determining that the wholly state-owned 
entity was an instrumentality); FCPA OPR 94-01, supra note 92, at 1 (determining that the 
general director of the state-owned enterprise was a foreign official); FCPA OPR 08-01, supra 
note 109, at 12 (determining that the DOJ would not take action against the American company 
for engaging the chairman of a part-owned government entity). 
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the instrumentality designation.200  Additionally, the DOJ will not take into 
account a foreign jurisdiction’s opinion as to who qualifies as a foreign 
official.201  Ultimately, these releases indicate that even if the DOJ determined 
that an entity is an instrumentality, it may not commence enforcement 
proceedings if the entity’s status as a foreign official was ending,202 payments 
or fees to the official would be reimbursed by the foreign government,203 or if 
the American company made promises to educate its foreign partner about 
FCPA compliance.204 
The SEC’s non-binding litigation releases and administrative orders, 
although more factually specific than the DOJ’s pronouncements, define 
foreign official and instrumentality in equally broad terms.205  For example, the 
Syncor and DePu releases demonstrate two important considerations for 
businesses working with foreign health systems: (1) state-operated hospitals 
are considered instrumentalities by the SEC;206 and (2) physicians employed 
by those hospitals—especially those who control purchasing decisions—are 
treated as foreign officials.207  These considerations, when viewed in light of 
the DOJ’s Opinion Procedure Releases, indicate that some level of state 
ownership places an entity within the instrumentality category.208  Further, the 
DOJ and SEC releases show that entities either wholly owned 209  or  
                                                 
 200. Compare FCPA OPR 93-01, supra note 94, at 1 and ); FCPA OPR 94-01, supra note 
92, at 1 (discussing foreign instrumentalities that were apparently wholly state-owned), with 
FCPA OPR 08-01, supra note 109, at 2 (noting that the purported instrumentality in question was 
partly state-owned). 
 201. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 202. FCPA OPR 08-01, supra note 109, at 10, 12. 
 203. FCPA OPR 93-01, supra note 94, at 1. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See generally Diagnostic Prods. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 51724, 2005 SEC 
LEXIS 1185, at *1 (May 20, 2005) (arguing that defendant DPC violated the FCPA by making 
commission payments to doctors and employees of state-owned hospital laboratories); SEC v. 
Syncor Int’l Corp., Litigation Release No. 17887, 2002 WL 31761454 (Dec. 10, 2002) (arguing 
that Syncor violated the FCPA by making payments to doctors in hospitals that were controlled 
by foreign authorities). 
 206. See Diagnostic Prods. Corp., 2005 SEC LEXIS 1185, at *3–5 (stating that the Chinese 
state-owned hospitals that comprised DePu’s customer base were instrumentalities); see also 
Syncor Int’l Corp., 2002 WL 31761454, at *1258 (explaining that Syncor’s foreign subsidiaries 
made payments to physicians employed by state-run hospitals). 
 207. Syncor Int’l Corp., 2002 WL 31761454, at *1262; see also Diagnostic Prods. Corp., 
2005 SEC LEXIS 1185, at *3 (finding that the defendant violated the FCPA by making payments 
to doctors at government-owned hospitals in China). 
 208. Compare supra note 202 and accompanying text (explaining that the SEC views state-
owned hospitals as instrumentalities), with supra notes 138 and 151 and accompanying text 
(explaining that state-ownership, whether in whole or in part, is seemingly a factor in the 
instrumentality determination). 
 209. See, e.g., FCPA OPR 93-01, supra note 94, at 1 (providing an example of a wholly 
owned government entity as an instrumentality). 
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majority-owned210 by a government are instrumentalities, which could lead to 
the argument that entities minority-owned by a government are not 
instrumentalities. 
D.  The Lack of Clarity in the Statute and the Current Enforcement Trend Has 
an Adverse Effect on Business 
The lack of clarity in the FCPA and the current trend of increased 
enforcement has resulted in high costs for American businesses and foreign 
businesses with American branches that may conduct business abroad.  In 
order to comply with the FCPA, many companies must undertake onerous due 
diligence and implement large-scale compliance programs.211  Furthermore, 
the cost of due diligence and compliance does not include the potentially 
enormous fines that a company may have to pay under a settlement 
agreement,212 with Siemens’s $800 million settlement as a prime example.213  
Although large multinational corporations can afford the costs of doing 
business related to the FCPA,214 smaller companies may not have such fiscal 
flexibility.215  Therefore, smaller companies may face greater barriers to entry  
into foreign markets due to the large costs related to FCPA compliance.216 
                                                 
 210. See, e.g., FCPA OPR 08-01, supra note 109, at 2 (discussing the majority  
government-owned entity in a release in which the DOJ refrained from acting yet declined to state 
that the entity was not an instrumentality). 
 211. See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 3–4 (stating that many businesses 
spend millions of dollars to develop and implement sophisticated compliance systems); see also 
Koehler, supra note 18, at 1001 (explaining that compliance based on information gleaned from 
non-binding plea agreements is wasteful and expensive); Westbrook, supra note 80, at 561 
(explaining that the FCPA’s uncertainty results in significant costs for companies, especially in 
compliance measures). 
 212. See Westbrook, supra note 80, at 555–56 (detailing the multi-million dollar FCPA 
settlements that companies such as Siemens, Halliburton/KBR, and BAE Systems have paid). 
 213. See Dan Slater, Siemens Settles in U.S. for $800 Mil, Leaving $$ for German 
Authorities, WSJ LAW BLOG (Dec. 15, 2008, 8:57 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008 
/12/15/siemens-settles-in-us-for-800-mil-leaving-for-german-authorities (noting an $800 million 
settlement entered into by a European company to dismiss an action arising under the FCPA). 
 214. See Mike Koehler, Two-Tiered Justice?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 20, 2010), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/two-tiered-justice (postulating that the current FCPA enforcement 
trend has created a “two-tiered justice system” in which large corporate actors are able to pay the 
settlement’s full cost and even retain business with the U.S. government, whereas smaller actors 
cannot so easily avoid FCPA liability). 
 215. See Rashna Bhojwani, Note, Deterring Global Bribery: Where Public and Private 
Enforcement Collide, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 66, 95–96 (2012) (explaining that the private 
consequences of an FCPA violation are potentially catastrophic for small-to-medium-sized 
businesses). 
 216. Cf. DAVID KENNEDY & DAN DANIELSEN, BUSTING BRIBERY: SUSTAINING THE 
GLOBAL MOMENTUM OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 13 (2011), available at 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/busting-bribery-sustaining-global-momentum-for 
eign-corrupt-practices-act (explaining that current FCPA enforcement trends not tempered by 
judicial review will create high barriers to entry in foreign markets for small businesses). 
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If the FCPA terms were narrowed and clarified, the playing field would be 
leveled.217  Introducing transparency in the foreign official and instrumentality 
terms—whether through amendment, case law, or agency guidance—will 
reduce the costs required for compliance efforts.218  Further, lowering costs for 
due diligence and compliance will allow smaller and larger companies to fairly 
compete, resulting in greater consumer choice and pricing.219 
III.  A TWO-PART ANALYSIS FOR THE DETERMINATION OF 
INSTRUMENTALITIES AND FOREIGN OFFICIALS WILL PROMOTE GREATER 
OVERSEAS INVESTMENT AND ACCURATELY TARGET TRUE VIOLATORS OF THE 
FCPA 
As discussed previously, the DOJ and the SEC vowed to continue rigorous 
FCPA enforcement.220  However, the FCPA could potentially chill overseas 
investment as businesses have little binding authority or guidance to precisely 
analyze whether an individual or entity is a foreign official or 
instrumentality.221  The majority of the “law” that corporate counsel have to 
work with is the DOJ’s and the SEC’s broad positions in their administrative 
rulings and settlements.222  To remedy this demand for authoritative guidance, 
courts should adopt a two-step analysis based on the Lindsey and Carson 
opinions and the FCPA’s legislative history. 
This analysis would first examine whether an alleged government entity is 
an instrumentality, and second whether an employee of said instrumentality 
possesses any discretionary authority.  Application of this framework will 
assist authorities in targeting only those companies that affirmatively attempt 
to corrupt government employees that have actual discretion over government 
action.  A refined analysis that clarifies the foreign official and instrumentality 
terms would prevent corrupt actors from relying on a defense based on the 
vague and undefined nature of the statute’s terms.  This will allow for more 
accurate prosecution of foreign corruption and eliminate any potential chilling 
effect on foreign investment. 
                                                 
 217. See Koehler, supra note 4, at 131–32 (arguing for a narrow definition, which would lead 
to more consistent rulings). 
 218. Cf. Westbrook, supra note 80, at 575 (explaining that clarified terms in the FCPA will 
make it easier for companies to effectuate compliance programs). 
 219. See Kovacich, supra note 164, at 559 (finding that compliance will be easier if the 
regulations are interpreted more narrowly and consistently). 
 220. See Greene, supra note 163. 
 221. See Kovacich, supra note 164; see also Roger M. Witten et al, Prescriptions for 
Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Identifying Bribery Risks and Implementing 
Anti-Bribery Controls in Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences Companies, 64 BUS. LAW. 691, 723 
(2009) (noting the non-binding nature of SEC and DOJ releases). 
 222. See Westbrook, supra note 80, at 560; see also supra Part II.C. 
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A.  An Instrumentality Should Be Either Wholly or Majority-Owned by a 
Foreign Government and Operate as a Dependent Arm of the State 
The Lindsey and Carson cases represent positive steps in clarifying what 
entities qualify as an instrumentality.223  To determine whether a foreign entity 
may qualify as an instrumentality, courts should first examine the extent of the 
entity’s government ownership and operation.224  Majority ownership is the 
most rational level of ownership and is most closely aligned with the Lindsey 
and Carson opinions225 as well as the DOJ and SEC releases.226  As part of this 
analysis, some practitioners have suggested looking at the degree of 
nationalization or privatization in a country.227 
In addition to the foregoing factors, courts should analyze the entity’s 
function or purpose because this may be relevant to whether the entity is an 
instrumentality.228  This part of the analysis would examine whether the entity 
is commercial in nature, like a state-owned pharmaceutical company, 229 or 
governmental in nature, like a public health agency.230  If the entity is primarily 
                                                 
 223. See supra Part II.B. 
 224. See United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09–00077–JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at *5 (C.D. 
Cal. May 18, 2011) (explaining that the extent of government ownership is a relevant factor for 
determining if an entity is an instrumentality); United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 
1115 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (explaining that an instrumentality is financed in large part by the public). 
 225. See Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (explaining that a government should finance an 
instrumentality and that CFE possessed that characteristic); cf. Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *4 
(explaining that a “mere” financial stake by a government in an entity is not sufficient to 
determine its instrumentality status); see also House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 
20 (statement of the Hon. Michael Mukasey, Former Att’y Gen, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton 
LLP) (recommending that the statute be amended to indicate the level of government ownership 
required for the entity to qualify as an instrumentality, and specifying that a majority share is “the 
most plausible threshold”). 
 226. See supra Part II.C. 
 227. See STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS 19–20 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing national socialization when defining 
instrumentalities and explaining that the more privatized a nation is, the less likely a given entity 
is an instrumentality). 
 228. See Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (stating CFE was responsible for the supply of 
electricity, a function described by the Mexican government as a “quintessential government 
function.”).  In Carson, the defendants were charged with bribing power companies.  Carson, 
2011 WL 5101701, at *1–2.  As in Aguilar, where the entity in question was an instrumentality 
that had a “quintessential” government function, the court denied the motion to dismiss the 
indictment.  Id. at *8. 
 229. See, e.g., Central Public Sector Undertakings, GOV’T OF INDIA, DEP’T OF PHARM., 
MINISTRY OF CHEMS. AND FERTILIZERS, at 2, http://pharmaceuticals.gov.in/cpsu.pdf (describing 
Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Limited, one of India’s five publicly-owned pharmaceutical 
companies). 
 230. See Meier & Mori, supra note 184, at 133 (noting that the WHO Constitution states that 
governments are responsible for protecting the public health and well-being).  But see James B. 
Roche, Health Care in America: Why We Need Universal Health Care and Why We Need it Now, 
13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1013, 1028–29 (2001) (noting that in Germany, the private sector, and 
not the government, is responsible for healthcare). 
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commercial in nature, a court should examine the level of ownership231 before 
examining whether or not the entity is “widely understood to be performing 
official government functions.”232   However, where the entity is primarily 
governmental, a court may conclude that the entity is an instrumentality.233  
This part of the inquiry would allow a court to discern those commercial 
ventures in which a government may have a stake from those instrumentalities 
that provide services to a population.234  This additional analysis allows a court 
to examine with precision whether a company was truly targeting an official of 
a government entity to secure an improper business advantage. 
B.  A Foreign Government Employee Should Possess Discretionary Authority 
to Secure a Business Advantage in Order to Qualify as a Foreign Official 
After the instrumentality assessment, an additional step is necessary to 
determine if that employee has any corruptible discretion.  The legislative 
history demonstrates a struggle between including a broad definition of official 
versus including a restrictive definition that encompasses only those with 
discretionary authority. 235   Because the statute requires corrupt intent, 236 
however, an official must have some duty involving free will so that a payment 
could persuade him or her against acting properly.237  The statutory language 
does not support the assertion that every employee is corruptible and, 
therefore, should qualify as a foreign official.238 
Requiring courts to examine whether the employee in question possesses 
corruptible discretionary authority would separate actual officials from mere 
government employees.  Individuals with a position of power or influence who 
could secure opportunities for foreign businesses would qualify as foreign 
officials within the original meaning of the statutory term. 239   Further, 
employees, such as mid-level staff members, who do not have the discretionary 
authority of management-level employees would not qualify as foreign 
                                                 
 231. See text accompanying notes 224–26. 
 232. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. 
 233. See id. (concluding that the CFE was an instrumentality carrying out a government 
function of providing electricity). 
 234. See notes 229–30 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra Part II.B. 
 236. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2006) (prohibiting a corrupt payment to a foreign 
official).  Black’s Law Dictionary defines the verb “corrupt” as “to change (a person’s morals or 
principles) from good to bad.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 397 (9th ed. 2009). 
 237. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977) (“In using the word ‘corruptly’, the committee 
intends to distinguish between payments which cause an official to exercise other than his free 
will in acting or deciding or influencing an act or decision and those payments . . . which do not 
involve any discretionary action.”). 
 238. See supra Part II.B. 
 239. See supra Part II.B. 
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officials.240  Focusing on discretionary authority aligns the “foreign official” 
term with the legislative history.241   Further, such analysis would ensure that 
the law targets only those companies that, in fact, targeted a foreign 
instrumentality’s employee with bribes because of his or her influence within 
the government. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In the wake of the DOJ and the SEC’s current enforcement push, the 
business community is grappling with the FCPA’s terms.  Companies seeking 
to conduct business abroad are confronted with a difficult choice—engage in 
expensive due diligence and implement a costly compliance program to cover 
all potential scenarios, or risk massive fines or settlements from concurrent 
DOJ and SEC enforcement proceedings.  Companies subject to the FCPA’s 
jurisdiction need an appropriate tool to navigate the FCPA in this heightened 
enforcement environment.  The proposed two-part analysis based on the 
FCPA’s legislative history and recent court opinions will introduce 
transparency into the FCPA and allow the business community to ensure that 
they are engaged in fair and honest business dealings.  A clarified FCPA will 
adequately equip those who are subject to the Act’s jurisdiction with the tools 
to respond to the government’s current enforcement push, while ensuring that 
those who are truly engaged in foreign bribery will be cast into the sunlight. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 240. See, e.g., Staff Scientist, Intramural Prof’l Designations & Procedures, Intramural 
Research Sourcebook, Nat’l Insts. of Health, http://sourcebook.od.nih.gov/prof-desig/staff 
-sci.htm (explaining that the staff scientist position at NIH is a time-limited support position that 
does not have the authority to initiate new research programs).  The sourcebook also notes that 
staff scientists are not paid via the traditional General Schedule Civil Service (GS) salary 
mechanism for federal employees.  Id.  A comparable employee in a foreign research institute 
potentially may not receive a salary directly from the government and similarly lack authority 
within the institute for new research.  It seems unlikely that such an individual with circumscribed 
authority could be considered a foreign official under the FCPA. 
 241. See supra part II.B (discussing the legislative history of the FCPA). 
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